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Mutual insurance has been shown, theoretically and empirically, to be 
incomplete and limited by asymmetric information and lack of 
enforcement mechanisms.  While some research has shown that networks 
based on kinship, neighborhood and ethnicity may provide a locus of 
insurance and thus a way of overcoming these problems, these studies are 
not fine enough to predict the inclusion and exclusion of individuals.   
Using data from rural Ghana, we examine the role of social relations in 
obtaining assistance in the face of shocks.  We examine this at both the 
intra-household and community levels.  At the household level, asking for 
and receiving assistance from the spouse is related to gender, the quality 
of the marital relationship, and the wealth of household members.  At the 
community level, asking for and receiving help are correlated with 
membership in a major lineage, participation in secular organizations, the 
individual’s fostering history, and anticipated land inheritance.  We also 
show that these factors differ depending on whether the shortfall was for 
a household or personal item (as perceived by the respondent).  This work 
helps us to identify individuals who are more likely to fall outside of 
mutual insurance networks and require interventions to help them cope 
with risk.   
 
JEL classification: D1, O12, Z13. 
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1.  The puzzle of incomplete insurance in village communities 
 
  Theory predicts that, when there is perfect information and perfect 
enforcement, risk-averse members of a community that face risks in their sources 
of income should engage in mutual insurance to completely insure idiosyncratic 
income shocks.  If it holds true, changes in individual consumption across states 
of nature would be unaffected by changes in individual income and proportional 
to changes in average community consumption.  Empirical tests of this 
hypothesis have rejected full insurance, but they have also shown that some 
degree of mutual insurance does indeed exist (Deaton, 1992; Townsend 1994; and 
Gertler and Gruber, 1997).  This has opened the door to a series of analyses to 
find out (1) what limits complete insurance and (2) who gets to be included and 
excluded in mutual insurance schemes. 
 
  Analyses of factors that limit the quality of insurance have focused on 
problems of monitoring and enforcement.  If there are observability problems, 
households have private information that cannot be obtained by their insurance 
partners.  Ligon (1998) shows that, in this case, inducing truthful revelation and a 
high level of effort requires a contract that offers a higher utility for revealed 
good outcomes than for bad ones, and therefore results in less than full insurance 
in some states of nature.  Unless this is done, partial insurance will be observed 
at the comunity level.  If there are enforcement problems, binding commitments 
cannot be specified, and insurance partners must rely on self-enforcing 
agreements.  In this case, risk-sharing will be incomplete in states of nature with 
large shocks since a household will only provide a transfer if the discounted 
expected future benefits from participating in the insurance agreement exceed 
 1       the one time gains from defection (Kimball, 1988; Coate and Ravallion, 1993).  As 
an alternative to self-enforcement, transfers can be secured by incurring 
extraction costs.  If these costs are variable, increasing with the level of transfer 
requested from partners, the community may chose partial insurance as the 
optimum level of insurance (Murgai et al., 2001).   
 
  Mutual insurance may, however, be practiced over networks of 
individuals other than the community as a whole, raising the question of who 
insures with whom, and if some individuals are left uninsured, who are the 
included and who are the excluded.  To answer this question, research has 
focused on identifying the configuration of networks of reciprocal exchange 
between self-selected individuals (Platteau, 1991; Fafchamps, 1992; Fafchamps 
and Lund, 2000).  When there are association costs, insurance may be better 
provided in small sub-coalitions of individuals with high levels of insurance as 
they have low extraction costs (Murgai et al., 2001).  Empirical studies show that 
these groups tend to form on the basis of a number of criteria including kinship, 
neighborhood, ethnicity (Grimard, 1997), and gender (Goldstein, 2000).  If 
mutual insurance is only practiced among members of sub-coalitions, leaving 
some individuals outside insurance networks, tests of mutual insurance at the 
community level will show imperfect insurance. 
 
  This broad characterization of the formation of networks and sub-
coalitions is, however, not fine enough to predict inclusion and exclusion of 
specific individuals in a community.  This is serious if the excluded are 
vulnerable poor people left without insurance coverage.  Inclusion/exclusion 
should be looked at from the angle of individuals in need of insurance because 
they have been exposed to a shock which they are not fully able to absorb 
  2       themselves.  As a consequence, they find themselves short of cash to cover 
specific expenditures, either to meet household needs or to acquire personal 
items.  This is what we study in this paper. 
 
  Critical to undertaking this task is an understanding of the social 
connections that underpin networks and social coalitions, and thus the next 
section frames the hypotheses we examine using anthropological work done on 
the area under study.  Section III discusses the data we use for our analysis.  
Section IV lays out the logical framework we use to organize the empirical 
analysis.  We then proceed in Section V to analyze econometrically the responses 
obtained by a person short of cash for the desired purchase of a household item.  
The same analysis is repeated in Section VI for the desired purchase of a personal 
item.  In Section VII, we analyze the differential quality of insurance among those 
we have identified as included in insurance networks versus the rest of the 
population.  We characterize the coping mechanisms which, in the end, are being 
used by different categories of households to cope with shocks.   We also look at 
the differences in access to insurance for the poor and the non-poor.  Section VIII 
concludes. 
 
2.  Framing the question 
 
Answering the question of inclusion-exclusion at the individual level 
takes us into psychological analysis of the relations among individuals in a 
household, and sociological analysis of the relations between individuals in a 
community.  We investigate two hypotheses: 
 
 3         H1:  In a traditional agrarian community, many individuals who are short 
of cash to meet an expenditure do not ask their spouse for help, and some who 
ask do not get it.  When this happens, this is due to poor marital relationships as 
perceived by the demanding party for asking, and as measured by the difference 
in perceptions between spouses for receiving help. 
 
  H2:  Many individuals who are short of cash do not ask others or do not 
obtain help from others.  When this happens, this is due to lack of social capital 
or to fear of social stigma and loss of reputation if they ask. 
 
  Our grounding for these hypotheses draws on the anthropological 
literature that analyzes how networks of individuals form and what the 
functions of these networks are.  The primary “network” is composed of spouses.  
In a Western perspective, we may expect the household to be the logical unit of 
insurance, given the communal nature of many expenses and the ease with 
which spouses can observe each other’s activities.  However, evidence from 
Ghana and nearby countries seems to indicate that this is not the case -- West 
African households tend to operate more as a collection of separate individual 
economies.  For example, Vercruijsse et al. (1974) discuss the coastal Fante 
communities in Ghana.1  They note that “...women are economically active in 
their own right as much as the men are and this is not affected by being married 
and having children.  Accordingly, their income does not have the character of a 
supplement and cannot even be conceived as being part of ‘family income’” (p. 
36).  Numerous writers such as Kwamena Poh (1974) argue that, for the Akan 
(the dominant ethnic group in the study area), marriage is an economic and 
                                                 
1 While the area under study is composed primarily of Akwapim Akan, there has probably been 
some Fante influence. 
  4       procreative “contract”, not a spiritual union.  Oppong (1974), characterizing the 
traditional Akan norm of marriage, notes that: “according to custom, the Akan 
husband and wife do not own, manage, or inherit together any exclusive or 
substantial property of their own” (p. 328).  She finds (in her sample of civil 
servant couples) that “more than twice as many husbands own property together 
with their kin as with their wives, and fewer than one in ten couples have joint 
accounts...The new urban norm thus follows the traditional pattern to some 
extent in that responsibility for day to day maintenance of the family seems to be 
shared by most husbands and wives, while the majority maintain separate 
financial arrangements for spending, owning, and saving” (p. 329-30).2 
 
This practice of maintaining separate economies while jointly providing 
for communal consumption can be a source of significant frictions.  Oppong 
(1974), in documenting economic practices among civil servants in Accra, writes 
that: “In discussions, spouses commonly state that they insulate most of their 
cash and property dealings from observation and control by their partners on 
purpose...  In some cases, the separation of interests is itself a matter of mutual 
agreement by husbands and wives, who consider the arrangement to be the most 
suitable adaptation to their domestic situation. In other cases, the arrangement is 
a continual source of friction, each spouse repeatedly attempting to gain more 
knowledge of and control over the other’s spending” (p. 330).  While we will not 
be able to explain why levels of friction differ among spouses, we will examine 
their implications for the provision of assistance from one spouse to the other. 
 
                                                 
2 Oppong is studying civil servants.  We might expect them to be the most divergent from the 
Akan tradition of separate economies, both because of their relatively observable salaries and 
 5         A natural venue for insurance outside of the household is the ethnic 
group.  Indeed, this was the approach taken by Grimard (1997) in a study of 
mutual insurance in Côte d’Ivoire.  He found that mutual insurance, even if only 
partial, is practiced among members of a same ethnic groups.  The area under 
study here is fairly homogenous in terms of ethnic groups – most of the 
respondents are Akwapim, a subgroup of the Akan.    Within the Akan, however, 
the lineage has a central role in social life.  As Smith (1972) puts it, “whatever he 
wishes to do in life, the Akan turns to his lineage (abusua) for help; kindred 
consciousness is the most important fact in his life” (p. 113).  These lineages are 
matrilineal, a child belongs to the lineage of his or her mother.  Some authors 
(e.g., Fortes, 1950) argue that it is the clan’s association with local chiefs (often the 
chief was the head of the dominant clan) that was the most relevant unit of 
government in the Ashanti confederacy.   In addition to political association, the 
lineage is an important locus of economic rights.  For example, the traditional 
form of access to land was through the lineage, and property was passed to 
matrikin, not to one’s own children (who would presumably inherit from their 
mother’s brothers).  The economic and political rights conferred by lineage may 
also be useful in building the stock of social capital which enables individuals to 
command assistance from others than kin. 
 
  Lineages may also provide insurance directly as they provide a strong 
social network in times of trouble.  Brokensha (1972a) explains that “we are 
concerned with this lineage, which is most important in matters of land tenure, 
inheritance, and any sort of ‘trouble,’ including debt, arrest by the police, help in 
school fees, or finding employment” (p. 78).   Fortes (1969) documents the role of 
                                                                                                                                                   
their urban/”modern” lifestyles.  The fact that they are not is evidence of the deep seated nature 
of this feature of marital relations. 
  6       lineage in providing assistance in times of trouble: “Ashanti link this with the 
obligation of the lineage to help a member who is in debt or extreme distress.  A 
lineage could not and cannot be held responsible for the private debts of any of 
its members.  But it is incumbent on the head to take action to save a member 
from being driven to desperation by debt or misfortune” (p. 188).   
 
  Using the broad definition of these lineages, the resulting groups are 
generally quite large.  While there is some debate in the literature about this, 
there are probably less than ten of these that encompass the Ashanti population.  
Such dispersed groups are probably not the relevant unit for an analysis of local 
economic activity.  Fortes provides some insight into how these units may be 
disaggregated when he writes, “the lineage has a segmentary structure, each 
segment being defined in relation to other segments of a like order by reference 
to common and to differentiating ancestresses.  This allows of both accretion to 
and differentiation within lineages” (Fortes, 1950, p. 255). 
 
  This local segmentation is particularly important for informal insurance.  
Fortes (1950) writes that “mutual aid -- as when a member gets into debt or 
funeral expenses have to be met -- is extended throughout the lineage, but the 
heaviest responsibility falls on this segment” (p. 257).  The local segment that he 
refers to is descendents of four to five generations from the same ancestresses.3   
 
  Fortes’ characterization of local segments seems to be what we observe in 
the villages under study here.  He notes that there are generally two or three 
                                                 
3 As regards to terminology, Fortes (1950) and Brokensha (1972a) state that the Twi word abusua 
denotes both the larger lineage and the more local clan segment, while Ayisi (1974) provides a 
 7       dominant lineages in a village which account for about half of the population.  
This is roughly in accordance with what we observed in our four village clusters.  
Based on the evidence above, we can expect these local lineages to serve as 
networks that provide assistance to members.   
 
In addition to the spouse and the lineage, membership in a variety of 
social organizations may be important as they either provide insurance directly 
(see Goldstein, 2000, for an example of the importance of these groups) or serve 
as vehicles that build the stock of social capital used in securing insurance (e.g., 
reputational effects for contract formation).  Some data on the purpose and 
structure of organizations were collected from these villages but are not yet 
available.  Hence, in the analysis that follows, we will use total organizational 
membership rather than membership in a specific organization.     
 
3.  Data 
 
  The data we use come from a two year household survey carried out from 
November 1996 to October 1998 in the Akwapim South District of the Eastern 
Region of Ghana.  Initially, four village clusters were selected based on their 
varying degree of market integration and diverse cropping patterns.  As we will 
use social indicators in our analysis, it is worth discussing the history of these 
villages in some detail.  “Village 1” is  a pair of adjacent villages three miles West 
of the large market  town of Nsawam.  Both villages were settled by Ashanti 
migrants during the 1850s.  “Village 2” lies about nine miles East of Nsawam and 
four miles Southwest of Aburi (an older larger town that was home to one of the 
                                                                                                                                                   
technical discussion of the nomenclature.  Fortes (1969) provides a detailed discussion of the 
political and social organization of the lineage.     
  8       first Christian missions in Ghana) on an road joining the two large towns.  It is 
made up of two towns, 150 and 80 years old, that joined together 50 years ago.  
This village has the largest population of the four clusters with about 2030 
people.4  Five miles North of Village 2 (and a 45 minute journey by vehicle) lies 
“Village 3”.  It is made up of a central town and two surrounding hamlets.  The 
central town is fairly small (population is around 340) , and it is the youngest of 
our four villages as it was settled in 1939.  People were farming this area long 
before, however, as one of the neighboring hamlets (pop. 110) was settled 200 
years ago.  With limited access to non-farm income opportunities, Village 3 is by 
far the most agriculturally active community among the four.  Two miles south 
of Aburi, and one mile from the road from Aburi to the capital of Accra, is 
“Village 4”.  Settled in 1821, it has a population today of around 990 people.  
Twenty five years ago, cocoa farming was the major livelihood in Village 4,  and 
the village was fairly well off.  Today, no one is growing cocoa and farming has 
shifted to food crops.  Despite this shift in agricultural income, the village has 
continued to grow, nearly doubling in size since the early 1970s.5 
 
Within each village cluster, 60 married couples or triples were selected at 
random for the survey.6  Men and women were interviewed separately by an 
enumerator of the same gender.  The survey was conducted in 15 rounds, about 4 
to 6 weeks apart.  A common set of agricultural questions was asked at each 
round and specialized modules (including on expenditures, shocks, transfers, 
and social interactions) were asked during different rounds.  Information on the 
                                                 
4  Population figures are calculated using the number of houses multiplied by the average 
household size (5.6) in our data, adjusted for a joint occupancy rate of 37% (GSS, 1995) in this 
region. 
5 These histories are based on information from the village level questionnaires that also include 
social organizations, market infrastructure, and political and social organizations. 
 9       data and questionnaires is available at 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~udry/ghanadata.html.   
 
  The data that we use in this paper are mainly drawn from the later rounds 
of the survey (rounds 14 and 15) when respondents were given a detailed 
transfers questionnaire.  This questionnaire (which evolved from round 14 to 
round 15) gives us a detailed characterization of: 
 
•  Who in the community is, at a particular moment, short of cash to meet 
expenditures to acquire household items and personal items. 
•  Whether a person in this situation asks for assistance from his/her spouse 
or not. 
•  Whether a person in this situation asks for assistance from someone 
besides his or her spouse. 
•  Whether a person who asked for assistance from his or her spouse gets 
approved or rejected. 
•  What are the coping instruments that a particular person short of cash 
uses in addition to transfers from their spouse, family members, or 
friends. 
 
  To complement this information, we also use data from earlier rounds that 
give us a characterization of the quality of spousal relations.  These relations are 
characterized under a number of aspects.  Importantly, they are appraised 
separately by each side of the relation, which allows us to characterize how one 
party to the relation assesses its quality, and also how this quality assessment 
                                                                                                                                                   
6 About 5-10% of the households in the sample are polygamous. 
  1 0       diverges between the two parties.  The variables on which we have information 
indicate the degree of trust each member has in the other, the degree to which the 
respondent thinks that his or her spouse treats him or her fairly, how well the 
respondent is getting along with her or his spouse, and whether there is a history 
of domestic violence in the relationship or not.  Aside from domestic violence, 
which is binary, all relationship variables are ranked on a 1 to 5 scale, with 5 
being the best.   
 
  We also use two other questionnaires for information on the social 
standing and interactions of individuals.  The family background questionnaire 
provides us with a large number of variables that characterize the individual’s 
social standing in the community.  We add to this data using one of the learning 
questionnaires.  In an effort to understand how agricultural technology was 
spread through these villages, respondents were asked if they knew seven 
people in the community selected at random.  We use this to measure the 
probability that the individual knows any other individual in the village.  We 
also know how often they talk with these individuals, so we can also construct a 
variable of intensity of social interactions using these data.   
 
 
4.  A proposed logical framework to analyze responses to a cash shortage 
 
This section lays out the framework we use to analyze how people go 
about securing assistance.  The way in which the questionnaire was structured 
was to elicit who provided the assistance in times of shortage, but not the order 
in which the consultations occurred (asking first to the spouse, then to others, or 
the reverse).  Hence, part of our task will be to examine alternate structures of 
 11       this process.  Before turning to this problem, we examine in greater depth the 
determinants of who is short in an effort to map the realized shortage to some of 
the underlying processes that may have caused it.   
  
4.1.  Understanding who is short of cash 
 
We start by discussing what may cause the declared shortage and by 
speculating on how the respondent’s report of a shortage is associated with 
unexpected income shocks. Reports of shortages come from the transfers 
questionnaires where respondents were asked if they have been short of cash to 
buy a household or a personal item.  This shortage could come from a number of 
causes (e.g., idiosyncratic income shocks, consumption smoothing difficulties, 
and the like)  so our first task is to see if we can shed light on the causes and 
correlates of the shortage.   
 
Table 1 provides a probit estimate of who is short of cash when needing to 
buy an item for the household.  In addition to the village dummies, the two 
significant variables are a measure of agricultural shocks (lagged one survey 
round, about six weeks) and the level of personal wealth.   The agricultural shock 
variable indicates that some of the reported shortages are due to the unexpected 
income shocks we associate with conventional insurance tests.  The fact that 
wealth is negative and significant is consistent with general difficulties with 
consumption smoothing for individuals with lower levels of liquid assets.   
 
We can also get a sense as to the cause of these shortages by asking the 
respondents directly.  Table 2 presents their answers.  These responses are 
broadly consistent with our probit results.  Respondents indicate that shortages 
  1 2       come from not having sold crops (28%) and delayed harvest (11%).  But they also 
show that the realm of income shocks is wider than just agriculture –- shocks 
associated with illness (12%) and losses in non-farm businesses (10%) are 
important. 
 
Respondents were asked separately if they were short of cash when they 
needed to buy an item for themselves.  Table 3 presents the results of a cross 
tabulation of the responses to this and the household item shortage.  Data show 
that, while some respondents were short for both household and individual 
items (6.3%), many were short for only one or the other (with household items 
dominating (20.4%)).  This separation of types of shortages gives a preliminary 
indication that it is worth considering the two events separately. 
 
Table 4 provides a probit estimate of who is short of cash to buy a 
personal item.  In these results, agricultural shocks are not a significant predictor, 
but individual wealth and whether or not the respondent had received financial 
assistance from their family or parents in starting their household are.7  Table 5 
shows the respondents’ explanations of why they were short.  As with household 
items, the main reason is that they did not sell crops, either because of a 
marketing failure or a crop failure.  Self illness seems to play a more important 
role than it does in the household items shortage.  There is also a larger 
dispersion across different minor reasons leading to a large group of “other” 
responses.   
 
                                                 
7 For both tables 4 and 1 we are unable to test for reported illness as a cause of the shortage as the 
timing of our illness data (other than that reported as a direct cause of the shortage) does not 
coincide with the shortage reports.  Our agricultural shock data spans the entire survey. 
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of cash in meeting an expenditure when they were exposed to a shock that they 
were not able to cope with through their own accumulated wealth.  Agricultural 
shocks play a major role in creating a shortage to meet an expenditure for a 
household item, and  self-illness is particularly important in creating a shortage 
for individual items.  Having established the origins of shortages, we now 
proceed to study how individuals use mutual insurance with kin and others to 
cope with these two types of shortages. 
 
4.2.  Frameworks for analysis 
 
We have seen that individuals face a number of causes of financial 
shortfalls that create unexpected variations in their consumption.  The question 
is:  how do they cope?  We examine what would appear to be a likely option: 
transfers from spouse and/or from others who are members of their social 
networks.  Figures 1 and 2 show the outcomes of the process of requesting 
assistance.  Figures 1 provides the data for cash shortages to acquire a household 
item, by individual respondent.8  Figures 2 provides similar information for cash 
shortages to acquire a personal item.  The figures below each response or action 
are the number of observations we have at each point.  They provide an 
overview of how the requests and responses are distributed across the types of 
items. 
 
  The data show that being short of cash is a frequent state of nature.  On 
average, 26.8% of the observations show a shortfall for household expenditures 
                                                 
8 Each individual reported the number of times he/she was short.  These figures define an 
individual as short of cash if he or she reported at least one shortage. 
  1 4       and 13.9% for personal expenditures.  A total of 34% of the households 
experienced a shortage of some type, including 6% who were short of cash for 
both types of expenditures. 
 
  Among the 214 cases where respondents were short of cash for household 
items, 49.1% asked their spouse for help, 18.7% asked others (some asked both), 
and 36% did not ask anyone (Figure 1).  Of those who asked their spouse for 
help, 74.3% received the assistance they were requesting.  The data indicate that 
only 1 person who asked for assistance for a household item from persons other 
than his or her spouse was turned down.  Ultimately, only 54.7% of those who 
were short of cash for a household item received assistance.  Of the 45.3% who 
did not get help, 79.4% did not ask and 20.6% asked but were turned down. 
 
  There are 111 cases of individuals reporting a shortage of cash needed to 
acquire a personal item (Figure 2).  Of those, 22.5% asked their spouse for 
assistance, 18% asked others, and 63.1% did not ask anyone.  Of those who asked 
their spouse for assistance, only 52% received help.  Between those who got 
assistance from spouses and from others, only 27% of those in need received 
transfers. 
 
  We can thus safely conclude that mutual insurance systems through 
transfers do not work for all individuals in need: 45% of those short of cash to 
acquire a household item and 73% for a personal item did not receive assistance, 
either because the individual did not ask for help, or because the demand was 
denied.  Note that not asking largely reflects internalizing rejection, or not 
wanting to incur the transactions costs associated with asking, as opposed to 
being able to cope through one’s own accumulated wealth since the individual 
 15       declared being short of cash.  Not asking, like having one’s request rejected, 
reflects failure of deriving benefit from mutual insurance when in need.   
Showing the relative urgency of needs, assistance for shortfalls to buy household 
items is more prevalent than for personal items.  With such a large gap in 
coverage , it is important  to explain who is successful in getting assistance and 
who is not, and from what source the assistance comes for those who succeed. 
 
We also need to understand (at least from an econometric standpoint) 
how individuals go about making their requests for assistance.  In our data, we 
observe that individuals do not obtain assistance from both spouse and 
community members, but from either one or the other.  Based on this, we can 
postulate two decision trees in seeking assistance.  One is to proceed first with 
asking the spouse and then, if rejected, asking other community members.  In 
this case, we have the sequence spouse-others (SO) in Figure 3  The other is to 
first ask others.  If this fails, the individual can then turn to his/her spouse in a 
quest for help.  In this case, we have the sequence others-spouse (OS) in Figure 4. 
.   
4.3.  The empirical strategy 
 
Given that there are very few observations of  assistance being requested 
from both the spouse and others, we estimate both decision trees portrayed in 
Figures 3 and 4.  In our initial examination of the data, we suspected that 
selection bias might be a problem.  Running the different nodes as selection bias 
corrected probits, however, yielded the result that the errors between the 
selection and the final probit were nowhere significantly different from zero.9  
                                                 
9 Note that the different sets of variables in each regression allow sufficient flexibility to identify 
the first stage in all cases. 
  1 6       Moreover, the general tenor of the selection corrected results were the same as 
those discussed here.  Hence, we report the uncorrected probits in what follows.   
 
It also might be that both decisions are taken simultaneously, not 
sequentially.  The most general representation of this is a bivariate probit of the 
two decisions.  This model would allow for all four options in asking for help:  
asking spouse, asking others, asking both, or asking no one.  Table 6 shows the 
results when we compare the log likelihood of the bivariate estimate with the 
two different sequential models.  As can be seen, the sequential models give a 
slightly better fit.  In addition, the bivariate results indicate that the same 
coefficients are significant as in the sequential models.  Hence, in what follows, 
we will report the results of the two sequential models, indicating differences 
across the two models when appropriate.   
 
 
5.  Responses to a cash shortage for household items 
 
5.1.  Requests to the spouse 
 
  Tables 7 shows the results of probit estimates of asking or not the spouse 
for assistance conditional on being short of cash for a household item.  It 
corresponds to node SO2 in Figure 3.   
 
  In an effort to get a qualitative feel for how respondents viewed their 
union, we asked whether they trusted their spouse, how fairly they thought their 
spouse treated them, and how well they got along overall.  We have included 
these variables in the regression in an effort to measure some of the intangibles of 
 17       the recent history of the relationship.10  One of the more striking result is the fact 
that better quality of spousal relations (as perceived by the respondent who is 
facing a cash shortage) are significantly associated with an increased probability 
of asking the spouse.  This is true at the one percent significance level for 
fairness, trust, and overall getting along.  Domestic violence is less robust, 
s h o w i n g  a n  e f f e c t  o n l y  a t  t h e  n i n e  p e rcent significance level and it is not 
significant in the estimation of node OS3.   
 
How should we understand these results?  Before turning to any 
interpretation, we need to address the potential for endogeneity.  Indeed, the 
most obvious explanation for these results is that the quality of relationship 
variables are determined by the response of the spouse to the request for help.  
While this critique is more germane to the next  section where we discuss the 
spouse’s response, we are partially protected from this source of  endogeneity 
though the use of marital quality data from the round preceding the two rounds 
in which we measure shortages. 
 
One explanation for not asking for help when spousal relations are poor is 
that the respondent is less likely to ask a spouse because he/she assumes that the 
spouse holds the same view and he/she will be turned down.  Another 
explanation is that the respondent does not take his/her spouse’s views of the 
relationship into account, but will not ask because of fears that the bad state of 
trust or unfair relations will lead to problems with reciprocity in the future.  Yet, 
another explanation is simultaneity -- that the marital quality variables are 
                                                 
10 We should note that these responses seem to be correlated with gender and village and hence 
we control for these effects (possibly in the administration of the questionnaire) with the 
  1 8       indicative of the failure of a larger process that drives insurance-type transfers by 
spouses, be it a commitment failure, the outcome of a non-cooperative 
bargaining process, or the like.  The problem with this result is one highlighted 
by Manski (2000) – while we can show a correlation with the state of relations, 
we cannot isolate the cause of the state of relations and rule out alternate 
explanations.       
 
  Another factor that is important in determining whether or not the spouse 
is asked for assistance is ownership of non-land assets.  This measure of wealth 
encompasses a wide range of assets including traditional cloth, livestock, and 
farm equipment (but not cash, where we failed to get reliable data).  We might 
expect that, if there is a cost associated with asking for assistance, individuals 
prefer to use their own assets rather than seek assistance.  Results show that 
wealthier individuals are less likely to ask their spouse for assistance.  This result 
confirms that declaring oneself short of cash for an expenditure is ex-post relative 
to using one’s own instruments for coping.  The probability of asking is also 
increasing in the wealth of the spouse.  This result that individual asset positions 
matter is consistent with the separateness of spouse’s economic lives highlighted 
by the anthropological literature on this area.11  
 
  Table 7 also indicates that two other factors are related to seeking 
assistance from the spouse.  First, women are more likely to ask their spouse for 
assistance than men. This is consistent with their roles as coordinators of much of 
the expenditures on children and household meals.  Second, is the somewhat 
                                                                                                                                                   
inclusion of gender and village dummies.  There is also some degree of collinearity among the 
reports of these variables, which is why we include each one in a separate regression. 
11 Although not reported here, spouse shocks were not significant. 
 19       puzzling result that the longer a couple has been married, the less likely the 
respondent is to seek help from his or her spouse.  This would suggest either 
increased separation in economic activities and insurance networks over the 
course of a relationship, or that the need to ask decreases during the course of the 
relationship, perhaps because we did not fully account for the accumulation of 
own assets.  The results in the next section will shed some further light on this 
issue. 
 
  We thus conclude that who asks for help to a spouse when short of cash to 
meet an expenditure for a household item can be explained by a number of 
factors.  One major factor is the quality of the relationship with the spouse as 
seen by the one who would be asking.  Also important is the relative wealth 
position of the partners.  Finally, women are more likely to ask their spouse than 
men when the household is in need.  Who asks is thus characterized by 
considerable heterogeneity across individuals, explaining both inclusion and 
exclusion from mutual insurance schemes. 
 
5.2.  Who gets help from his/her spouse? 
 
  In the majority of cases where the spouse is asked for help for a household 
item, he or she delivers (87%).  Tables 8 shows the results of probit estimations of 
a spouse’s positive response for the SO sequence.   
 
In explaining success in getting help, we use the absolute difference 
between the perceived quality of marital relation as seen by each spouse.  These 
differences can be interpreted in various ways.  For example, the difference in 
“getting along” (the answer to the question “over all, how well do you get along 
  2 0       with your spouse”) is illustrative of communication – the answer would be 
determined by how well the respondent saw the relationship and this would 
depend on perception of the spouse’s views.  Answer to the questions on “how 
fair” the spouse treats the respondent and how much the respondent trusts 
his/her spouse are more indicative of a psychological asymmetry in the 
relationship – these are answers that are not likely to be tainted by the 
respondent’s perception of the spouse’s view of the relationship.  
 
Estimates from both decision trees (nodes SO3 in Table 8 and OS4 (not 
reported)) indicate that the difference in perceived fairness of treatment is 
significantly negatively correlated with the decision to render assistance.  The 
difference in responses to getting along and trust are not significant.  Results (not 
reported here) show that this result is being driven by the spouse’s report of 
fairness.  Hence, we can conclude that those who do not receive insurance from 
their spouse are in the first instance those who do not ask because they have a 
low view of the trust, fairness, or quality of the relationship in general, and 
(given that they ask) those who get turned down are those whose spouse has a 
dim view of the fairness of the relationship.   
 
A number of intriguing possibilities are suggested by this two-tiered 
result.  For example, the fact that people with a positive view of fairness ask, only 
to be turned down by a spouse with an opposing view, suggests a lack of 
communication or information between the pair.  It is also consistent with a 
gambling view of the decision to ask: given a low cost of asking, even those who 
know that their spouse does not share their opinion about fairness of the 
relationship might take the chance in case they get lucky.  In the end, we cannot 
rule out these competing explanations of the dynamics that leads to these 
 21       characteristics being correlated with the transfer process.  However, the fact that 
difference in perception of fairness is important in explaining success when 
asking suggests that communication in marital relationships is far from perfect 
and that this is correlated with increased probability of rejection.  
 
5.3.  Who gets help from others? 
 
In examining who seeks and receives assistance from persons outside the 
household, the results change somewhat depending on which decision tree we 
are using.  Table 9 provides the results for estimating the probability of asking 
others using the sample provided by the SO sequence (node SO4).  
 
The sample associated with the SO tree (the 111 individuals who did not 
ask their spouse) shows a number of social capital variables to be significantly 
associated with the probability of asking others.  Belonging to the major lineage 
in the village is positively associated with asking others.  We include lineage 
because, as indicated earlier, it plays an important role in Akan economic and 
social life.  The result is consistent not only with possible assistance rendered by 
lineage members, but also in the associated social standing that comes from 
being a member of the lineage that controls access to the largest amount of land 
and holds a number of local political and ceremonial positions.  The number of 
local organizations that an individual belonged to is also significantly correlated 
with the probability of asking others for assistance.  We know that a few of these 
organizations exist specifically for insurance reasons (e.g., one group pays out for 
funeral expenses), so it is natural that this would be related to the probability that 
an individual could ask others for insurance for a variety of shocks.  Village 
effects are also significant for two of the villages.  This is indicative of inherent 
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capture with our set of variables.  Indeed, in our work in the villages, we 
discovered many differences that defy categorization in simple quantitative 
variables.  For example, one village was without a chief and, instead, authority 
was vested in a council of elders.  This difference in power structure made the 
resolution of disputes (say over the reneging on a reciprocal assistance 
agreement) markedly different in this village compared to others.   
 
Among individual characteristics, gender is an important determinant of 
seeking assistance outside the household.  This is consistent with the results 
obtained by Goldstein (2000) which indicate that women tend to insure outside 
the household and family, doing so instead with other women.  For women, 
mutual insurance networks in the villages studied thus run by gender rather 
than kinship.  The number of fostering episodes that an individual experienced 
while growing up is negatively related to the probability that he/she will ask 
others for assistance.  Fostering is quite common in these villages, as in much of 
West Africa.  This variable is capturing two main effects. First, fostering usually 
takes place outside the village and thus the respondent’s absence while growing 
up curtails his or her ability to develop networks.  Second, it is likely indicative 
of a lower status within the family, resulting in lower willingness of extended 
family members to help.  In this specification, personal wealth matters as the 
anticipated land inheritance is positively related with the probability of asking 
others.  As future access to land provides capital to guarantee the future 
reciprocity of favors (as well as serving as an indicator of family wealth and 
status), this is not surprising. 
 
 23       In an effort to examine the effects of broader social interactions, we 
include a measure of the probability of knowing any random person in the 
village as an independent variable.  We included this measure because the level 
of social connection that it indicates would provide a natural vehicle for not only 
identifying more effectively possible sources of assistance, but also providing 
greater social connections to enforce mutual insurance arrangements.12  T h i s  
effect is significantly negative in the OS2 specification.  This result is counter to 
what we would expect.  However, one plausible explanation for the underlying 
relationship is that there is a reduction in social standing associated with asking 
others for help.  This loss of social standing comes from revealing that you (or 
your partner) cannot make ends meet. Revealing this inability to cope will lead to 
being recognized as a risky person to deal with and is likely to curtail future 
access to credit and other forms of capital, as well as incurring a broader loss of 
status.  The more people the individual knows, the higher the cost will be as 
knowledge of this failure will spread more broadly through the village.  Hence, 
these individuals are more likely to avoid asking, unless it is absolutely 
necessary.  Social connections can thus be a curse in calling on others for mutual 
insurance.  A complementary explanation draws on the fact that the ability to 
provide for one’s spouse is a major criterion by which a relationship is judged.  
Hence, admitting an inability to provide one’s share of the household items 
reveals a weakness in the relationship that will harm future bargaining positions, 
both within the relationship and also in case of divorce.  
 
                                                 
12 An alternative to this hypothesis might revolve around the “big man” hypothesis.  A “big man” 
is someone who is well known and usually wealthy.  While this informal position confers added 
prestige, it also brings responsibility to respond to the needs of others.  Big men might seek to 
avoid others in order to avoid unilateral claims for assistance.  However, given the high average 
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by a number of factors that are indicative of the individual’s standing in the 
community.  Lineage position is important, both in support that comes directly 
from membership or from the anticipated access to resources through 
inheritance.  Relations conferred by growing up in the community (fostering)  
and gender also appear to be important.  However, social connections in the 
community may be a curse for mutual insurance if asking others is a signal that 
undermines social capital. 
 
 
6.  Responses to a cash shortage for a personal item 
 
The response to a cash shortage when needing to buy a personal item 
seems to generate a different type of response. 13  We can see part of the picture 
from the data in Figures 2 as compared to Figure 1.  In this section, we estimate 
probits to examine the two possible decision trees when seeking assistance for a 
personal item.14  Results show that not only the patterns in seeking assistance 
differ, but different characteristics are associated with the choice of whom to ask.  
This is particularly true for the decision to ask someone other than the spouse. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
value of probability of knowing variable, this does not seem to be what is captured by this 
variable.   
13 These data were collected under the instruction that this was a good to be consumed solely by 
the individual.  Feedback from the field staff indicated this was a fairly straightforward concept. 
14 Note that, because of the low number of observations, we do not estimate the spouse response 
to a request for assistance. 
 25       6.1.  Requests to the spouse 
 
Results of these estimates for the SO sequence are given in Table 10.   
Results for the OS sequence are essentially identical and not reported.  The 
request to the spouse is strongly associated with gender in estimates of both 
decision paths  (nodes SO2 and OS3).  Women are much more likely to ask their 
spouse for help than the other way around.  
 
The variables we use to measure quality of the conjugal relationship are 
not significant.  However, a history of domestic violence is significant and 
negative.  The most frequent causes of domestic violence cited by male 
respondents were insults from their spouse (17 %) and disobedience (11%).   
These do not suggest direct economic causes (in fact very few of the other 
responses were centered around directly economic reasons).  Hence, the effect of 
domestic violence on the propensity to ask is likely to be through the tenor of the 
relationship, in particular how it affects the bargaining process, as well as the 
bargaining outcomes.  Since a spousal transfer for a personal item is more likely 
to be a gift than a transfer for a household item, the importance of domestic 
violence is suggestive of the role of the tenor of the relationship in explaining the 
ease with which spouses may approach one another with a request for a gift. 
 
6.2.  Requests to others 
 
  In seeking assistance for a personal item, a different set of social relations 
and individual characteristics matter than for a household item.  Table 11 
provides these estimates for the SO sequence (node SO4).  Four results are 
notable. 
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First, belonging to the major village lineage is significantly and positively 
associated with seeking outside assistance.  This is similar to what we observed 
in seeking help for a household item.  Second, the number of years a respondent 
or his or her family has been in the village is negatively related with the 
probability of asking others.  We included this variable given the social standing 
that the anthropological literature attributes to the length of time an individual or 
his or her family has lived in a village.  This social standing might provide 
greater access to informal insurance.  Our result here is consistent with the fact 
that long established families have better access to modes of insurance other than 
mutual transfers.  If there is a social cost incurred in obtaining the transfer 
needed (and this is perhaps more pronounced for personal items which the 
transferor might not approve of), then these individuals would prefer to use 
other modes to obtain the needed item -- be it credit, use of reciprocal labor 
arrangements, or the like.   
 
Our third common result is that the variable for the probability of 
knowing others is not significantly related to with seeking help from others.   
However, when we use the probability of talking to others (a measure of quality 
of relationship), this is significantly and positively related to the probability of 
asking others.  This result might seem to be at odds with the household item 
result where the signs on the probability of knowing others is negative.  This 
may indicate that, for a personal item, there is no reflection on the intra-
household relationship when one seeks help from others.  In the case of a 
personal item, our respondents prefer individuals that they know well because 
the strength of their relationship with the person they are asking to for assistance 
 27       helps overcome problems of information and enforcement and thus allows for 
better mutual insurance.   
 
  Overall, the fact remains that asking others for help with a personal 
expenditure is more difficult than asking for a household expenditure.  Social 
connections (major lineage, talking to others) help, but social capital is clearly 
harder to mobilize for this purpose, leaving many excluded from insurance to 
cope with this type of shock. 
 
7.  A friend in deed?  The quality of insurance and the implications of 
exclusion 
 
The previous sections have identified the factors that are associated with 
asking  for and receiving help from others.  This section examines the “help” in 
more detail, examining the terms of the assistance and the implications for 
consumption smoothing.  We also discuss the strategies used by those who are 
rejected or never ask others for assistance.  The final part of this section looks 
more explicitly at the question of how the poor manage shortages and examines 
whether their access to this type of mutual insurance is different from the rest of 
the population.   
  
 
7.1.  The quality of insurance 
 
On what terms is help given by the spouse and by others?  Figures 1 and 2 
indicate that, even when help is forthcoming from a spouse or another 
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these figures.  What is clear is that the spouse treats household items differently 
from personal items, while individuals outside the household do not.  Spouses 
are more likely to provide assistance for a household item in the form of a loan, 
and to do this in kind rather than in cash.  According to discussions with 
respondents, this is often for fear of fungibility -- i.e., that the cash will not go to 
the designated household expense, which suggests contract enforcement 
problems.  
 
Personal items appear to follow a different pattern altogether, with 69 
percent of the assistance from the spouse taking the form of a gift.  Assistance 
from others for both types of items, on the other hand, is usually a loan.  This is 
different from those who buy items on credit in that there is usually no interest 
charged.  Items bought on credit (according to anecdotal evidence) incur an 
implicit interest rate as the credit price is different from the cash price once 
repayment spans a certain period of time.  
 
  Ultimately, what we care about is how this shortage of cash affects 
consumption. One way to test for the quality of the insurance received by those 
who obtained assistance is to look at the variation in their consumption relative 
to other members of the community.  Given the data we have from earlier rounds 
of the survey, we can conduct a test of the type developed in Townsend (1994) 
and others, and used in Goldstein (2000) on a different configuration of these 
data for full insurance.  If we assume that people who are helped in rounds 14 
                                                 
15 This is what distinguishes these loans from the response to the question of how individual’s 
managed (after being turned down or not seeking help).  The latter are likely to be consumer 
loans of shorter duration and implicit interest. 
 29       and 15 were also helped in these earlier rounds (i.e., they are usually helped), we 
can test whether this population and/or the rest of the village exhibits full 
insurance.  Our econometric test is to estimate the following equation: 
 
  cist − cist− 1 =a c  st - c  st- 1 ( )+b yist - yist- 1 ( )+ e 
 
where cist is the consumption of individual i in state s at time t,  c  st is the village 
average consumption and yist is the individual idiosyncratic income shock.16  
Theory predicts that, in the case of full insurance, β  should equal zero and α  
should equal 1, i.e., the change in individual i’s consumption should be 
unaffected by own income shocks and move with the community’s average 
change in consumption.   
 
Table 13 presents the results of this regression for the entire sample, and 
then separately for those who received help and those who did not,17 using 
consumption and shock data from the same survey.18  The income shock data 
consist of agricultural plot level unexpected events and illnesses.  The 
consumption data presented is for private consumption – goods that can be 
clearly assigned to individuals for their own consumption based on their own 
expenditure reports.  Thus, we define those who received help only as those who 
received help for a personal item outside of the household.  We estimate this 
equation (in parts B and C of Table 13) only for those who expressed a shortage 
as we cannot be certain about the classification of the rest of the population.   
                                                 
16 There are better ways to test this hypothesis (see for example, Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997)), 
but data constraints make this our best option. 
17 See Goldstein (2000) for a discussion of the data and the errors in variables estimation. 
18 Note that we face two sources of attrition here: missing consumption data in all panels, and 
those for whom we cannot identify help/no help in panels B and C.   
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When we estimate this equation for the entire sample (Table 13, Part A), a 
joint F-test of the coefficients fails to reject the hypothesis of full insurance.19   
When we estimate this equation for the sample restricted to those who received 
help in rounds 14 and/or 15, we also fail to reject the hypothesis of full insurance.  
However, when we estimate this equation for the sample of individuals who 
were short of cash for a personal item and received no assistance, we can reject 
the hypothesis of full insurance at the 3 percent level.  Although these results 
come from a small sample, they provide evidence that receiving assistance is 
consistent with full insurance, while failing to receive assistance when short is 
associated with full insurance failure.   
 
7.2.  How do the excluded manage? 
 
In round 15, the questionnaire included a component which asked those 
who received no help how they coped with their cash shortage.  We can see this 
data summarized in Figures 1 and 2 for the household item and the personal 
item, respectively.  The patterns of coping were different across the two items.   
 
In the case of a household item, the major response was to find some way 
to buy the item.  Most respondents (52%) bought the item on credit, followed by 
seeking additional work (9%) and selling crops from the farm (7%).  A minority, 
but not insignificant number of individuals, responded by not buying the item 
(27%).  Overall, a larger fraction of those who were short of cash for a personal 
item received no help whatsoever (73% compared to 45% of those short of cash 
                                                 
19 The proper test for this hypothesis would be a Likelihood Ratio test, which we are working on.   
 31       for a household item).  The main mode of coping was to not buy the item (74%), 
followed by credit (10%), and finding additional work and selling crops from the 
farm (7% each).  Unlike the response to the shortage of cash for a household item, 
there was a difference in how each gender managed the shortage for a personal 
item, with women more likely to buy the item on credit. However, the dominant 
choice for both genders was to not buy the item.   
 
7.3.  How do the poor manage? 
 
In examining which groups might be excluded from mutual insurance, we 
can take inspiration from Jalan and Ravallion (1999).  Using data from China, 
they find that non-land wealth is positively correlated with a household’s ability 
to insure consumption.  This leads then to conclude that the poor are less well 
insured.  We can use two measures to examine whether or not the poor have less 
effective insurance.  One option is to use the wealth variable included in many of 
the regressions discussed above.  This is measured by non-land assets.  As our  
earlier results have shown, wealth matters at two junctures.  First, people with 
higher levels of average non-land assets during the two year survey period are 
less likely to have a shortage of cash for both household and personal items.20  
This suggests that they chose to smooth consumption using their assets.  Second, 
people with lower assets are more likely to ask their spouse for assistance with a 
household item.   However, wealth is not significantly correlated with the 
probability of asking others for assistance.   
 
                                                 
20 Note that two measures of land assets (inherited land and the number of plots owned) are not 
significantly correlated with the probability of being short of cash. 
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food expenditure.  We created two poverty lines:  one based on 80 percent of the 
$1/day benchmark, and the other, which is about half that amount, is defined as 
the bottom quartile of the expenditure distribution.  Data came from an average 
of the thrice administered expenditure questionnaires.21  Using these two poverty 
measures, we recalculated the estimates of who was short, using the specification 
of Table 1.  Both measures were not significantly correlated with the probability 
of being short of cash for a household item.  Similarly, when we estimate the 
probability of asking one’s spouse, the probability of the spouse helping, and the 
probability of asking others, we do not find that either measure of poverty is 
significant at the 10 percent level or better.22  Mutual insurance thus seems to 
work equally well for the poor. 
 
We can also examine those who end up without help in Figures 1 and 2 to 
see if the poor are disproportionately represented in this group.  An analysis of 
each group shows that, for the household item, 33 percent of the poor (using the 
first definition here and for the discussion that follows) receive no help, while 38 
percent of the non-poor receive no help.  While there is no major difference in 
representation, coping strategies are slightly different.  The poor are more likely 
to use credit (63% of poor) than the non-poor (40%).  The non-poor were more 
likely not to buy the item (35%) than the poor (26%) but we need to keep in mind 
that we are dealing with a small number of responses.  In terms of a shortage 
when needing to buy a personal item, the poor were more likely to defer 
                                                 
21 We use the sum of the respondent’s own reports of expenditures to determine poverty at the 
household (per capita adjusted) level.   
22 The closest result comes with the difference in fair specification of spouse helping where the 
first measure of poverty is negative with a z-statistic of 1.60 
 33       consumption (80%) than the non-poor (70%), and more likely to buy things on 
credit (20%) than the non-poor (5%).     
 
Thus, for the region under study, poor individuals have equal access to 
transfers from their spouse, family, and friends.  By contrast to the inference 
made by Jalan and Ravallion (1999) for China, mutual insurance is here equally 
accessible to poor and non-poor.  Being poor matters, however, in two ways.  
First, low wealth endowments are more likely to be associated with an initial 
cash shortage for both personal and household items.  Second, the poor utilize 
different alternate mechanisms when they are rejected from mutual insurance 
support or do not seek this assistance, relying more on credit or accepting not to 
buy the item and to defer consumption. 
 
8.  Conclusions 
 
This paper attempted to bring together the anthropological, sociological, 
and psychological dimensions of intra and extra-household relations with the 
work on risk and insurance in economics.  What we show is that the shape of 
social relations matters: personal relations within the household and social status 
and connections within the community are important for receiving transfers in 
times of shortage.  Within the household, the gender of the demanding party (+ 
for women), the quality of the relationship, and the wealth of the other partner 
are all associated with the likelihood of asking for assistance.  Among those who 
asked, and hence with good quality spousal relationships as seen by the 
demanding party, receiving assistance depends on equality in perception of this 
relationship between spouses.  Those who had a mistaken appreciation of the 
relationship are turned down.  Outside the household, membership in the major 
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(-), and anticipated land inheritance are all related to receiving assistance from 
others.  Gender is also associated with receiving assistance outside the 
household, with women more likely to get help for a household item.   
 
We also showed that the patterns of requests for assistance and responses 
to requests differ according to the item for which insurance is sought.  People are 
overall less likely to ask for help with a personal item.  Those who do capitalize 
on the strength of their social relations in seeking help outside the household.  
However, individuals with high levels of active connections in the village seem 
to be reticent to ask others for help with a household item, possibly to avoid 
losing social status in exposing weakness.  Domestic violence, rather than other 
measures of relationship quality, appears to be important in whether or not 
assistance for a personal item is sought within the household.  These contrasts 
suggest that there are different categories of people who are unable to access 
mutual insurance for specific types of shortages. 
 
These characteristics can help identify individuals who are likely to be 
excluded from insurance via transfers.  As we have shown, these individuals’ 
consumption shows that they are not perfectly insured, by contrast with those 
who received assistance.  In addition, we also examined the correlation of 
poverty with access to transfers in times of shortage.  We found that individuals 
who are asset poor are more likely to be short of cash for household and personal 
items and are more likely to ask their spouse for assistance with the household 
item.  However, they do not appear to face different responses to requests for 
transfers from others.  Hence, mutual insurance is more needed by the poor, but 
equally accessible to them. 
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Incomplete insurance in rural communities, as observed in most empirical 
tests reported in the literature, can thus be due to the social exclusion of many 
community members with specific individual, household, and community 
characteristics.  In fact, we have shown that inability to rely on mutual insurance 
to face cash shortages is surprisingly pervasive.  Mutual insurance thus works for 
some, but not for many.  And for whom and for what it does not work can be 
predicted, potentially helping target remedial assistance on the excluded 
individuals. 
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  Spouse helps
  78/105 + 13 = 91
  Spouse no help
  27/105
  Cash, n=47, avg=11,506, mean repay=7,190
  Kind, n=56, avg=10,820, mean repay=8,238
  12 get both cash and kind
  13 cases of help w /o asking
  8/27 ask other – These are the only 8
  who ask spouse and other
  Loa n 54/91
No loan 37/91
  Ask other
  32/214 + 8 = 40
  No help 1 /40
  Help 39/40




  Total no help:  97/214
  No ask 77
  Ask spouse and no help 19
  Ask others and no help 1
  How managed if no help:*
  52.2%  bought on credit
  28.3%  did not buy item
  8.7% found additional work
  6.5% sold crops





Assistance for the purchase of a household item 
Rounds 14 and 15, 245 households, 798 observations 
*  Based on questions in Round 15 only with 402 observations 
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  Short of
  ca sh
  111/796
  Ask spouse
  25/111
  Spouse helps
  13/25
 Spouse no help
 12/25
  Cash, n=11, avg=12,909, mean  repay = 4,773
  Kind, n=2, avg=25,000, mean repay = 0
  1 who asked spouse also asked other and got
  help
3/25 ask other – These are t he only 3
who ask spouse and other
Loan 4/13
No loan 9/13
  Ask other
  16/111 + 1 + 3 = 20
  No help 2 /20
  Help 18/20




Total no help:  81/111
No ask 70
Ask spouse  and no help  9
Ask others and no help 2
  How managed if no help:*
  9.5% bought on credit
  73.8% did not buy item
  7.1% found additional work
  7.1% sold crops





Assistance for the purchase of a personal item 
Rounds 14 and 15, 245 households, 796 observations 
*  Based on questions in Round 15 only with 402 observations 
 












































Figure 4. Decision nodes in sequence Others-Spouse (OS) 
 




Explaining who is short of cash to buy a household item 
Probit analysis, sequence spouse-others, node SO1 
Dependent variable:  individual is (yes/no) short for the purchase of a household item 
        
Variables dF/dx  P>|z|  Mean 
        
Income shock       
     Value of damage due to agricultural shock (10^6 cedis)  0.07  0.08  .0063 
Individual asset position       
     Size of inherited land area (ha)  0.06  0.11  0.19 
     Size of land area anticipated to be inherited (ha)  0.05  0.41  0.06 
     Number of plots owned  -0.01  0.50  3.50 
     Value of non-land assets (10^6 cedis)  -0.01  0.01  0.75 
     Received other assistance to get started = 1  0.05  0.30  0.19 
Individual characteristics       
     Gender: woman = 1  -0.04  0.35  0.52 
     Has other sources of income = 1  -0.04  0.21  0.52 
Household characteristics       
  Member of major village clan = 1  0.03  0.41  0.47 
Location      
     Village 2 = 1  -0.06  0.28  0.23 
     Village 3 = 1  0.19  0.00  0.27 
     Village 4 = 1  0.16  0.00  0.24 
Goodness-of-fit      
     Number of observations  743     






Reasons for being short for household item 
(n= 212) 
Reason %  of  responses 
Did not sell crops  28 
Illness (other family member)  12 
Crop was not ready when expected (delayed harvest)  11 
Unexpected loss in business  10 
Did not get paid for work when expected  7 
Illness (self)  7 
Unexpected household expense  7 
Other 18 
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Table 3 
Incidence of cash shortage to buy household and personal items
% of total, n = 799 observations 
    
   Household  item 
     No  Yes  Total 
 No  65.7  7.6  73.3 
Personal item  Yes  20.4  6.3  26.7 







Table 4   
 Explaining who is short of cash to buy a personal item   
Probit analysis, sequence spouse-others, SO1   
Dependent variable:  individual is (yes/no) short for the purchase of a personal item 
        
Variables dF/dx P>|z|  
        
Income shock       
     Value of damage due to agricultural shock (10^6 cedis)  0.02  0.33   
Individual asset position       
     Size of inherited land area (ha)  0.03  0.21   
     Size of land area anticipated to be inherited (ha)  0.03  0.51   
     Number of plots owned  0.01  0.04   
     Value of non-land assets (10^6 cedis)  -0.00  0.01   
     Received other assistance to get started = 1  -0.05  0.04   
Individual characteristics       
     Gender: woman = 1  -0.01  0.92   
     Has other sources of income = 1  0.01  0.67   
Household characteristics       
      Member of major village clan = 1  -0.00  0.85   
Location      
     Village 2 = 1  -0.01  0.41   
     Village 3 = 1  0.32  0.00   
     Village 4 = 1  0.20  0.00   
Goodness-of-fit      
     Number of observations  741     
     Pseudo R2  0.20      
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Table 5 
Respondents’ reasons for being short of cash for self items 
(n=111) 
Reason %  of  responses 
Did not sell crops  32 
Illness (self)  13 
Did not get paid for work when expected  7 
Did not get expected job  7 
Crop was not ready when expected (delayed harvest)  6 









Comparison of alternate decision structures 
Likelihood ratios 
    
 Help  asked  for 
household item 
Help asked for 
personal item 
Bivariate probit  -1130  -42.6 
Sequential decision     
     Spouse-Others  -1078  -41.1 
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  Table 7    
Explaining who asks spouse for money when short of cash to buy a household item   
Probit analysis, sequence spouse-others, node SO2   
Dependent variable:  individual asks spouse for money (yes/no) when short of cash to purchase a 
household item   
       
Variables dF/dx  P>|z|   
       
Individual asset position       
  Value of non-land assets (10^6 cedis)  -0.01  0.05   
Individual characteristics       
  Quality of marital relations as seen by the demanding party: Fair  0.17  0.00   
  Gender: woman = 1  0.17  0.10   
Household characteristics       
       Value of spouse assets (10^6 cedis)  0.03  0.01   
       Years married  -0.01  0.01   
       Number of household members  -0.03  0.05   
Location      
  Village 2 = 1  -0.39  0.00   
  Village 3 = 1  -0.34  0.01   
  Village 4 = 1  -0.65  0.00   
Goodness-of-fit      
 Number  of  observations  174     
   Pseudo R2  0.29      
       
Partial results with other variables characterizing the quality of marital relations as seen by the 
demanding party   
 Trust  0.17  0.00   
 Get  along  0.19  0.00   
  Domestic violence = 1  -0.17  0.09   
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Table 8 
Explaining whether spouse helped with cash when asked for a household item 
Probit analysis, sequence spouse-others, node SO3 
Dependent variable:  spouse was helped (yes/no) when asked for cash for a household item 
     
Variables dF/dx  P>|z| 
     
Income shock     
  Value of damage due to agricultural shock (10^6 cedis)  -1.80  0.30 
Individual characteristics     
  Gender: woman = 1  0.05  0.67 
Household characteristics     
   Absolute difference in spouses’ perceptions of fairness  -0.08  0.04 
   Value of spouse assets (10^6 cedis)  0.00  0.76 
   Years married  0.01  0.17 
Location    
  Village 2 = 1  -0.14  0.07 
  Village 3 = 1  -0.09  0.46 
  Village 4 = 1  -0.16  0.07 
Goodness-of-fit    
 Number  of  observations  81   
  Pseudo R2  0.22    
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Table 9    
Explaining who asked others for help when short to buy a household item     
Probit analysis, sequence ask spouse-ask other, node SO4 
(and partial result for sequence ask other-ask spouse, OS2 node)     
Dependent variable: 
individual asks others (yes/no) when short of cash to purchase a household item     
            
Variables dF/dx P>[z]  mean     
Individual asset position           
     Size of inherited land area (ha)  -0.01  0.89  0.42     
     Size of land area anticipated to be inherited (ha)  0.49  0.09  0.05     
     Value of non-land assets (10^6 cedis)  0.01  0.88  0.72     
Individual social capital           
     Probability of knowing any person in the community  -0.72  0.19  0.90     
     Years respondent or family lived in the village  -0.00  0.25  75.28     
     Number of fostering episodes  -0.17  0.04  0.77     
     Number of organizations respondent belongs to  0.10  0.10  1.21     
Individual characteristics           
     Gender: female=1  0.26  0.07  0.46     
Household characteristics           
     Member of major village lineage = 1  0.21  0.06  0.59     
Location          
     Village 2 = 1  -0.30  0.13  0.10     
     Village 3 = 1  -0.53  0.01  0.37     
     Village 4 = 1  -0.55  0.01  0.44     
Goodness-of-fit          
     Number of observations  111         
     Pseudo R-squared  0.28         
          
Partial result with other variables characterizing the individual’s social capital instead of  
probability of knowing others 
     Probability of talking to others  0.04  0.91  0.19     
          
Partial result in OS sequence, node OS2           
Probability of knowing any person in the community  -0.45  0.08  0.91     
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Table 10 
Explaining who asks spouse for money when short of cash to buy a personal item 
Probit analysis, sequence spouse-others, node SO2 
Dependent variable:  individual asks spouse for money (yes/no) when short of cash to purchase a personal item
     
Variables dF/dx  P>|z| 
     
Individual asset position     
  Value of non-land assets (10^6 cedis)  0.00  0.30 
Individual characteristics     
  Quality of marital relations as seen by the demanding party:  Fair  -0.03  0.48 
  Gender: woman = 1  0.46  0.00 
Household characteristics     
     Value of spouse assets (10^6 cedis)  -0.01  0.40 
     Years married  0.00  0.90 
     Number of household members  -0.01  0.63 
Location    
  Village 2 = 1  NA  NA 
  Village 3 = 1  -0.15  0.63 
  Village 4 = 1  -0.17  0.33 
Goodness-of-fit    
 Number  of  observations  86   
   Pseudo R2  0.28    
     
Partial results with other variables characterizing the quality of marital relations as seen by the demanding 
party 
 Trust  -0.02 0.50 
 Get  along  -0.03  0.55 
  Domestic violence = 1  -0.19  0.04 
 
NA:  Village predicts failure perfectly. 
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Table 11    
Explaining who asked others for help to buy a personal item     
Probit analysis, sequence ask spouse-ask other, node SO4     
            
Variables dF/dx P>[z]       
Individual asset position           
     Size of inherited land area (ha)  -0.04  0.51       
     Value of non-land assets (10^6 cedis)  0.03  0.37       
Individual social capital           
     Probability of knowing any person in the community  -0.34  0.43       
     Years respondent or family lived in the village  -0.00  0.01       
     Number of fostering episodes  -0.03  0.60       
     Number of organizations respondent belongs to  0.02  0.65       
Individual characteristics           
     Gender: female=1  0.06  0.43       
Household characteristics           
     Member of major village lineage = 1  0.13  0.07       
Location          
     Village 3 = 1  -1.00  0.00       
     Village 4 = 1  -0.63  0.00       
Goodness-of-fit          
     Number of observations  80         
     Pseudo R-squared  0.43         
            
Partial results with other variables characterizing the individual's social capital instead  
of probability of knowing others 
     Probability of talking to others  0.38  0.06       
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Table 12 
Forms of Assistance  
          
     Type  Form    
    Gift  Loan  Cash   Kind  Both  Number 
Spouse assistance               
  Household item  40.7%  59.3%  38.5%  48.4%  13.2%  91 
  Personal item  69.2%  30.8%  84.6%  15.4%  0.0%  13 
                 
Assistance from others               
  Household item  28.2%  71.8%         39 






Errors in variables regression: Change in private consumption 
        
A. Whole sample (n = 203)        
Dependent variable: change in private cons. Coefficient  t-stat  95% conf interval 
Village mean consumption  -0.57  -0.75 -2.10  0.93 
Change in illness shocks  -0.01  -0.05 -0.36  0.34 
Change in agricultural shocks  0.02  1.04  -0.02  0.05 
Constant 5214  -0.71 -9303  19732 
F-Test of perfect insurance coefficients  F(3,199) = 1.96  Prob > F = 0.12 
        
        
B. Those who received assistance for personal items (n = 14)    
Dependent variable: change in private cons. Coefficient  t-stat  95% conf interval 
Village mean consumption  -2.18  -0.91 -7.52  3.16 
Change in illness shocks  -0.17  -0.71 -0.71  0.36 
Change in agricultural shocks  -0.03  -0.37 -0.20  0.14 
Constant 33851  1.74  -9501  77204 
F-Test of perfect insurance coefficients  F(3,10) = 0.70  Prob > F = 0.57 
        
        
C. Those who were short but received no assistance (n = 49)    
Dependent variable: change in private cons. Coefficient  t-stat  95% conf interval 
Village mean consumption  -1.53  -1.58 -3.48  0.42 
Change in illness shocks  -0.16  -0.80 -0.57  0.25 
Change in agricultural shocks  -0.01  -0.80 -0.03  0.01 
Constant 21979  1.85  -1928  45887 
F-Test of perfect insurance coefficients  F(3,45) = 3.20  Prob > F = 0.03 
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